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The Private Demand for Education in Rejction to Labor Harkot Conditions
 
In Less Developed Countries
 
Gary S. Fields 
October, 1972 
A common situation in developing countric-s in tne past two decades was a 
shortaqe of educated ranpower relative to tho expressed neods of the economy. 
any developme,,t r anners eli thal this skil led -anp_)wer shortage was serious­
ly retarding the develorrment p oces, and cons:derable resources were devoted 
to tool ing up the ,ducational system to eroduce more graduates in the shortest 
possible time. Citizens 3z-.-! education as pr,,idi-iq themselves and their children 
with the qual ificaetion. ne-edd :or th ',st-,neyinri, hiihest-status jobs; the 
more schooling spaces, the ,,reaer ie like! hood of a particular child securing 
the necessary cr,:dent .als. it ;s ir this sense of fami iies seekinn tohave their 
children educated that we shaiI tal abuut the deiurd for education. lore 
-we use rard 
to mean the number" or persons ,;ho would ie (o1 z'1,Uos) parents wish them) to be 
enroled in school u;der .- xistin7 conditions. Ali -inicatiorns are that during 
the years of shortagjes of ski I ed 'nanpower i-, demand for education was very 
specifically, throughout this pape' , shal! the ter ,oe for education' 
strong.
 
In recent years, however, many less developed countries have suddenly and 
apparently to their surprise found themselves with too many (relative to the 
absorptive capacity of the economy) rather Than too few,.orkers with intermediate 
educational attainnents. Forecasts of irnoendinn surpluses of even university 
,
 
This Daper is based on Gary S. Fields, A Theory of Education 9nd 'abor 
Harkets in Less DevelcDed Cuntrie-s, IJnpuhlshed doctoral dissertation, Jepart­
ment of Economics. Unive sitv of iizhigan, Ani Arhor; 1972, hereafter referred 
to as Thesis. The oreparEiion of Th,- i0esi 3 was a;ded by the rockefeller Founda­
tion; the United 'ttes A.:ency for interrictional Development; the Institute for 
Development Studies, University of .a!airohi" and ta C'-n er for Research on 
Economic Deelopme.ti l.niversityo. :.:iciaan. Tharks are axtended to Professors 
Elliot J. Rerq, Geor.je E. Johnison, Fran,, P. Staftord, and Lester D. Taylor for 
their invaluable c:-it-ic~snms and suggestions at all sP;ges of the thesis research. 
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grdae aeeoin nra igl frequent. ,Yet, even as surpluses of educated 
workers grow larger and lar-,er and the employment nrosi)ect- of workers with at 
given level of education continue to deteriorate, the peooDle continue to demand
 
education.
 
In this paper, wo construct a model of the demand for education*ln relation 
to :abor market conditions in less developed countries to try to understand 
why a high demand for education might be expected to persist in countries
 
characterized by a substantial surplus of educated 
labor. It miqhtbearfgued 
that the continued demand for education merely reflo.,cts the failure of citizens
 
to adjust their behavior to current labor market conditions. This position
 
implies that the demand 
for education will fall, perha-s drastically, as ex­
pectations come into line with reality. However, 
in contrast to this position,
 
we demonstrate in this paper that under 
 several alternative labor market scenarios 
the sustained private demand for education 
is quite rati onal and can be explained
 
by the net private benefits which the educated individual rectuives in the labor
 
Imarket. I 

The plan of the paper is asfol lows. 
 "4e first review the available evidence
 
on private rates of return to investment in schooling in less developed coun-

Tries' and then formulate a model of the demand for education as a function of 
the private return to education. After showina the ways in which this return 
depends on the total number of persons .3ducated and the number who enter the 
different labor markets, we then construct demFand for education schedules under
 
four alternative models 
 of labor market behavior. WJe show that in two of these 
models, when relatively well-educated workers are entoriqg the labor force for 
less skilled jobs the resulting labor force allocation is such that the private
 
returns to education and the demand for education wouJ,remain constant regard­
less of the number of surplus educated Persons. Furthermore, in a third model,
 
the demand for education would be expected to increase with the size of the
 
educated surplus. We su,.igest that these poss i b IlIiiti es taken together wi th 
In general, economists concerned wvrh education have not made expiicit'
 
the linkage between the demand for educd,:.n and the demand for educated
 
people. A notable exception is Blaug (1965). 

-
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other (actors which. migi cause the demand for education to be inelastic with
 
respect to the supply, provide an economic explanation for the sustained high
 
demand for education in less developed countries despite educated unemployment
 
and underemp Ioyment' .,
 
1. The Demand for Education and Private Returns
 
Education is desired by dlffarent groups for different reasons: by private
 
individuals who for job-related or other reasons want their children educated;
 
by firms and governmontal ,bodies who wish to employ educated persons; by policy­
makers who" feel that a wel 1.educated populace is necessary for national develop­
ment, and by teachers who are employed by the school system. The private demand
 
by families who %iould like their children educated u0 to a particular level is
 
our central concein in this paper, and'we are using "demand for education" to
 
mean the number o-7 per-on! who wish to be enroied in school under existing
 
conditions. This demand s notexpressed in textbook fashion ,wheirebycitizens 
demand different quantities in a markotplace at different prices. Rather, the
 
private demand for education is manifested throug.h the political process as
 
2 citizens bring pressure to bear on qovernmert officials to increase the number
 
of schooling spaces, not only .t the niven level but at prerequisite levels
 
as well The concerns of employers, develorEent planners, and teachers in turn
 
determine the w-iIIinqness of the educa','ioral plan' 3rs to adjust the supply of
 
educational opportunities in response,,to the jrivate dem.;nd and the speed of
 
adjustment,
 
It appears that the Drimary factor imotivatinq citizer. , to demand education
 
is not the economic or social development of the society as a whole but rather
 
the enhancement of their own personal economic and social status. The demand
 
for a given level of education nay therefore be presumed to depend on the size
 
of the expected private return to that level of sch6ol inj. The cross-country
 
This is no-' to imply. tha- citizns actually compute such returns, but
 
rather, fol lowing Fr;edn7n (,Il53), they behave as if they do. Nor is it meant 
to imply that the. size of the pr ivate return is the only determinant of the 
demand for education. 'h@ statu,; Fcwr, and prestige of being educated may 
be of equal or greater imrtanca than m--netary nsiderations. 1.1e may view these 
non-pecuniary factors as deterrrninri a minifmurn value of the demand for education 
-'; -and high Drivate ;'eturns as raising deinand above the base.
 
I,• : ++ : .> ,, .  ., •:: !:,.. .. .0
 
ievidence col lect ,d by P-;act'aropoulons and HinrchIiffe (1971) showstha't p r ivate :,, 
, rates of return to investrent in education are very hiqh; of the eels of 
~education... for each of ele--ven:less ,.Ieveloped countries for which' data were " , 
S available, o'nly. one is less than tern -)(ercent and most.,are above twenty percent;.' , 
": With few constraints imposed by the necessit-y of financing educational invest­
-mentbyrecourse toa capital market,- the.very high private-rates of return 
are readai ly trasliatod into. a very high Drivate deineed for education. 
2. A Model of Educational D:)mand ' 
, Let us consider a r~er!:on~s decision of whether or no.t to demand education..y 
Suppose for simplicity that -,,emay distingiuish, betwee-n' + .,o aroups of workers: 
those ,-,ho have receive:.d a t least a igiv7?n level o'l educotion, and those who 
h'aVe received less-. '.ic~ll groups zeu...ed re­.,,%l the-se the nd !'uneducatedl' 
spectively. TaiLot latnd,alsoHintery thereivaey,re- deantwo t,,pes duatonjobs:ar ilippinesy us sup.!r}ios e thatGh frof jobs w,;hich
enihrewy conbstraints isod bya ne-Jcetcsoffncn invest­the cionale 

on .!ucEated education may be a
 
desirable but not sseto .l tese ski led and led"
 
can be fillecbd by persons and jois in )hich 

ntinvsln uai edcation unski 
jobs respectively.Inl. less rc aovbtwn obe onest thaon te, nandcmost.are t en
!.We conisider two type-s of uns'ki I led Job in th odr 
ren br, private e or returna eu n ed ondh the rates f better 
.jbsfitsn deaer rcnture. waedfeetal eweifretsillvl
 
Inios lalchose in Aca muchilya8ote
le s developed countries, are 

than in the ':advanced" countries. .
 
. AThis is another effect of arge.tnubsidisto education. ""
 
formulation consistent with eiheer ()
This c is a neoclassical production.

functivn suclthat the marg ins Ierrluct of an uneducated: workerdn a ski ed­
jobspecalwy letss talote wage he must be aid, or (2)a production function
 
n
with fixedcoefficients
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If an 	individual does decide to De educated and is able to find a place 
he must pay the :3chcol fees and foreno earninqs in the unskilledin school, 

labor market AhiMe in school. The hnefit he receives is a hi.her expected
 
income over the revoir~ler of his life. How profitabl, (in economic terms) is
 
educational investment ic him?
 
For expositiornal ease, let us ossume that it takes one neriod to acquire
 
an education and the direct out-of-roocket costs are some amount C. The income
 
foregone during this period is the unskilled wage (UP') times the probability
 
The sum of these is the private cost
of beinq employed in that neriod (P). 
of education. 
The expected gains beryir one .eriod later. Let V. and VU be respectively The 
present value of expected errinqs of educated and uneducated persons if they 
enter 	the hiqlhest-wayin, labcr markot open to thorm, i.e.; 
(I) k/E lax (V s, V ) 
and 
(2) ' =max N " 
VES is +he present vaiju of ex:ect.d li ftico income of an educated person If 
he enters the labcr .arkat or skilled job.s, VA if he enters th, market for 
lifetime incomeunskilled jobs. Similarl, ,,,V is the oresent value A' expected 
for an uneducated worker AD1, enfersthe unskilled labor market, and VUA is the 
present value for an unskilled worker wno enters (or remains in) agriculture. 
Since education takes one period and the Senefits do not begin until the follow­
ing period, we must subtract from the earning"s streams VE and VU expected 
We therefore have the expected incrementalearnings in the current period. 

present value of benefits of education equal to 
(3) IVE - WsPS) - (VU -WuPu). 
-6-

The profitability of educational investment ,may be expressed either In
 
Internai rate of return or in present discounted value terms. Since the former
 
requires solution of a complicated quadratic exrression, we shall use the more
 
convenient present value formulation. Taking the difference between expected
 
benefits and costs, we find that the rpresent discounted value of investmerit
 
In education (P) is
 
(4) PV = VE - VU - 4sP S - C. 
In the usual manner, aggrecate demand for education may be exoressed as a
 
smooth positive function of the present value of investment in education:
 
D = f(PV).
(5) 

Equation (5) establishes the demand for education as a function of the
 
present value, which equation (H) tells us denends upon the maximum amount
 
one can expect to earn if he has an educ.3tion as compared to his expected earn­
ings if he is uneducated. The prosent value also dorends upon the probability
 
of obtaining ski lled employment. roth the maximur:1 earni:ig., and the probability
 
of finding a skilled job depend in turn, on the total number of persons educated
 
and the number who enter each labor market. Throuqh these interrelationships,
 
it becomes clear that:
 
When there is a surplus of educated labor relative to the absorptive
 
capacity of the ecciomy resulti6gin unemployment and underemployment
 
of the educated, the demand for education depends on the supply of
 
education and the allocation of the labor force bdween the various labor
 
mp "kets.
 
IThe omission of "th:er p-.silI right hand side variables is Inteded to 
emphasize the importance of *hc expected private economic returns as a 
motivation for the private derand for ducatior. on-economists such as 
Somerset (1971) and Court (1972) "ind that-the desire for education Is stlrbnly 
related to one's job nrospects and l'ihn the prohabi Iity of obtaining a high­
level job is low, the desire for education fal Is along with it. Even as ardent 
a supporter of the mass demand for education as ereday (1969) writes that 
"perhaps men should not w.mt rluitjSO much education uite so badly, since so 
many want it for the wrong reasons' but, he continues, "whatever his motives, 
an indivIdual's desire for education cannot he ig.nored." 
-7-
This point has not generally been recognized by economists.
 
In the remainder of this paper, we shall explore these relationships in 
greater detail. !iewill first describe four models of labor market conditions 
In less developed countries, then derive demand for education schedules in 
each case and show how the patterns differ, and finally interpret the persistent 
demand for education in light of the resultant patterns. 
2arket Behavior3. Four ilodels of Labor 
The literature concerning the labor market behavior of workers and employers
 
in the less developed countries with respect to education offers two general
 
conclusions. First, educated people do as a rule accept lower-level jobs, pre­
2 
sumably when it is to their personal advantage to do so. Second, employers In
 
many countries appear to be using educational attainment as a criterion for
 
hiring and selectinq the better-educated in preference to those with less educa­
tion.3 This suggests that the bumping model (to be described below) may be a
 
better general descriptici of labor market behavior in the less developed coun­
tries than the other models. However, since the available evidence in no way
 
rules out the applicability of the other models in other countries, we shall
 
analyze them as %tell. 
For a number of reasons (which are explained inThesis) we adopt the sim­
plifying assumptions that the total number of modern sector jobs and the educa­
tional mix of those Jobs are fixed. ",hat fol lows may then be thought of as a 
partial equilibrium model of the relationships between education and labor mar­
kets.
 
IThe first thrae of these models are presented formally in Thesis.
 
2Figures collected by the OECD (1969) for 53 countries show that while the
 
highly-educated are much more apt to be in the professional or manaqerial occupa­
tlions than persons with less education, a high dearee of educational attain­
ment is neither necessary nor sufficient for entry into the most lucrative and
 
prestigious occupations.
 
3Preferential hiring by educational level is documented in studies of India
 
by Blaug, Layard, and 1'1oodhal 1 (1969) and of Turkey by Krueger (1971), in unpub­
lished data from the 1971 'lairobi Household Survey, and in a symposium of man­
power and education experts (see Skorov (1968)). 
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A common feature o each of our labor market models is the failure of 
urban labor markets to equilibrate in order to, assure full emnloyment of the
 
labor force. Tradil'onal labor market theory *-.nuld predict that if the prevail­
ing urban wage is too high to clear the ,,arlrl-' ant ,.acies are flexible, some
 
surplus workers would ofer t1heir services a a lower ,,age, 0Mloyers would
 
pay less and adont rmore labor--intensive technoloj:es, and employment and output
 
would likely increase. This Drocess w )uld cnnti:iue until the urban wage 'aajusted 
for COST-Of- Iivinc d, ffer,=nces) enuals Tiie ,ur'al .ae.
 
The conventional preJzctio: has been ciel lenge, or two grounds. One
 
school of thought is tiat irj-itutiona! fc-tors which affect the bulk of the
 
labor force set the ,am. sir.ctu.:- abov- tiarlet-clearin; levels and prevent
 
workers arid employers from (I.-ial ly) making rp'c,,ment- and out-nut-increasing 
adJustments. The institutional causes froejentlv mentioned include the widepread 
effects of minimum wane le-jisla:ion, the inact of uovern,'ient wage scales through­
out the modern sector of I!-c. ocorom/, and. iaoe qains renotlated by labor unions.I 
A second and (not necessariiy coipetin.i arqumer, t is That sa veral alternative 
economic circumstances--t'e reducti-.n of hiring and treininn co.sts and gains
 
in worker efficiency 9s wages are raise' andJI t"-e determination of the urban
 
wage by macrocconomic savi: qs-i sv;srt erui li!rium---could cause a rural-urban 
wage differential and consequent urb,:i uriimplo, men* in ccuilibrium. Thichever 
set of forces -- ec:nomic or institutionil -- !,red-,minate inia (givencountry at 
a given time, there can be li-:tle dcubt that in the :ess developed countries 
today the resuling wo(e level 'ies above ,he rnarkt-clearino rate and that 
unemployment Is the cof:seouence. Hence, our model approaches the question of 
labor markel equilibrium 1-y reversing the conventional role of wages and the
 
labor force. !,ere, wages are given an.- the numrber of workers in various labor
 
markets adjusts in order to determine an equilibrium in terms of expected (life­
time) earnings.
 
On these points, see 3erq (1966), Reynolds (1965 and 1969), Frank (1968
 
and 1971), and Johnson (1972).
 
These circumstances are analyzed thoroughly in Stiglitz (1972a and 1972b)
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A. The Buminq Model
 
In the bumping model, we assume that workers are income maximizers 
and enter that labor force which offers the hiqhest expected income. Further­
more, we suppose that enployers Drefer to hire persons with more education at 
the prevailing wage rate. This may be because the educated are (or are believed 
to be) more productive than the uneducated, because employers orefer for non­
economic reasons to associate with the better-educated, or (some argue) because 
the educated elite seek to legitimize their r,,vn nositions at thetop of the 
pecking order by usinq an ojective' criterion like educational attainment 
2
 
to exclude others.
 
If it is *rofita~l (in an expected value sense), we would expect that 
some surplus educated persons would move to the front of the queue for the un­
skilled jobs and be hired first at the unskilie3d ,.,arqe rate, bumpin a less­
educated person from a job. Uneducated workers in unskilled jobs might be 
fired and replaced immediatelv, or instead displ;aced over time as uneducated 
retirees are replaced by the educatod. For simplicity, ,,e will assume ?:ero 
frictional unemnlovment Df educated ners,-ns in the uns'<i Iled labor force, 
Fol lowin n our earl ier distinction, the uneducated may choose between the 
urban unskilled *-nd a.qIricul-ural Isbor forcws, but they are excluded from the 
skilled labor force tu lack .- educ.-tional In this and theTo qualification. 

fol lowing two models, the uneducated are hrsuredchoose between these
to 

alternatives in order to maximize the exp'ected value of iheir incomes.
 
In the burnninq model, educatec workers are hired first. Fhis means that
 
uneducated workers are left with whatever unski lied jots the educated workers
 
do not take. Thus, education may be demanded in order to receive the advantage
 
of a better relative chance of being hired for an unskilled job. It is of course
 
conceivable that after a point there may be so many educated persons that the un­
educated are effectively excluded from obtaining modern sector employment and
 
the relative advantage is very nreat indeed.
 
Such a utility-maximizincg model is considered in Johnson (1970).
 
2See for instance '3owles (1971) and Carnoy (1971).
 
. The Labor ":arket Strati ficatiion :odel 
(I) Labor ]iarkot Stratificetion on the Supnly Side 
In contrasT tC th-c, hump,inc -iodel just describe,!, r-ducation in less de­
veloped countries has sornetimcs oenr criticiz,-ed for inculcating the few fortunate 
students with the feel inq that they are superior to the n-iasses. I Carried to 
Its logical conclusion, the iinlication is that the educated would always seek 
high-level, high-status jobs and never seek or accept lo,-level jobs which 
would :dirty their hands, oven if +hey could earn --,ore hy doinq 30. In such 
an economy, any surplus of educatd r)ersons ,Jould ali.a's in the laborha force 
for skilled jobs and never conrid-r emrplcyrant in unski I led .los. In such cir­
cumstances, labor markets 2ro, stratified !v considerations of status and prestige. 
(2) Labor iark,tt Strati f icatirn on th. wtand S ide 
Suppose that :duca1tcd .rsons ar .iI i )lq to .. or in unski I lel jobs but 
employers refuse to ii ro i, educa-te1, .-.ce2.!sh-, h ll ev that the educated 
are more apt to have lo, m r:I, r .sulin in lo.er :roductivity .:h le on the 
job, greater a!,senteeisri, and ",ore frecu'nt ivr. Tno labor rarket is also 
stratified in this c,- .. ')cause iK fruitful for th, educate,. to search "is only 
for the ski Iled jobs. is I rh. )r(-vi.us case-), -nV etra :ducatod persons will 
be unemplcyed in the skillIe'thr arce and nav:)r underemu Ioyed in an unskiIled 
job.
 
These two cases, although causally distinct, are analytically equivalent
 
and will be treated so subsequently.
 
C. The Pool inn "!odel
 
The bumping model assumes that educated workers are favored by employers
 
and hired in preference to the less educated for unskilled jobs. The labor
 
market stratification model (demand side version) assumes just the opposite.
 
See iHyrdal (1968).
 
-Il-
The pooling model embodies the third possibility: that education Is neither 
a help nor a hindrance in one's search for unskilled jobs. 
In the pooling qc.Jel, we still ro'lard education as necessary for the 
skilled jobs. A.ehave, however, a largo pool of workers searching for the un­
skilled jobs, these workers eing udifferentiatei by educational attainment. 
In the pooling model, the unskilled jobs are divided between the educated and
 
some random nrocss.
uneducated according to 

D. The -3riqiht Liqhts of the City Wodel 
The bright l ights of the city model erodies the view held by some2 that the 
city exerts an overwhIrinply stroq null on those who come in contact with it. 
This model ostiulrs that as a cons;equence of the:briht lights of the city" no 
workers, whethrr educatej or uneducated, once in fhe city would eve: return to 
the farm. H shal I, how.ever, assum that educatedc workers are expected income 
maximizers and wi 1, if it is proi ahla to do so. hu-p the less educated out 
of unskilled jobs. 
4. Demand for Education Schedules Under Alternative Labor iarket Conditions 
In this section, ,wedcrive tOD demand +or .a3ucation as 9 function of supply 
in each of the four models of lhor market behavior "ust described. This is 
done in comparative static ters, asking in each case what is the effect on the 
demand for education if society decides for whatever reason to educate another 
person.
 
A general expression for the channe in the demand for education 
if another 
person is educated may he found by differentiating (4) and (5) with respect to 
IThe educated may have better contacts and therefore better chances 
of being hired. However, 'e neqiect this possibility. 
2See for instance Little (1965)
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S. Doing so, we obtain
 
=(6) 	 -DD f, -g f 2 - f .. V UP w'S a 
D ISS. as • 
The specific v.alues of the partial derivatives in this expression are not con­
stant. Rather, they ar detromined by th3 re:ilocation of the ski lled and un­
ski I led labor forces between the various laluor markets which fol lows the edu­
cation of another person. The specific labor market ou:,.ome depends on whether 
the situation is one of labor ,narket stratification, bu7,winq, pooling, or bright 
lights of the city and the size of tho surplus of edJucar.,d nersons. In order 
to determine the signs and magnitudes of the consecunt real location for each 
alternative sized surplus it, ,ach of th-. diffrorent rmodrns, we require rigorous 
statements of the models an; derivations of the results. T!his is done in Thesis 
for the first three moclols but due to the ler:!,th an,.! tedium of these steps we 
shall only state the qual itative re,ults but not r:e~t the derivFetion here. 
A. The 	 L lrket Strati f icationCase of 'br 
Consider the first zone of thi !.Thor market stratification model in which, 
at the existina wac~e level, :ducated r ereons are in short supply. Because 
of this shortage, each educated icrson can expect to ,hvfully employed. This 
does not change if another person is .educated, provided there is still a 
=shortage. Since 	PS I, S = 0 and WE = 0. 
Furthermore, by 	choosing between the r,-l and urban unski Iled labor forces 
in order to maximize their expected incomes,uneducated persons will real locate
 
themselves so that the probalIity of obta.ining an unskilled job is unchanged 
in equilibrium, 	which implies 0V
7TS- : 0. Any other r,alIl!ccat ion woulId cause 
IA formal statement of the present version of the bright lights of the
 
city model and mathematical derivation of the results presented herein are
 
available from the author upon request.
 
there to be a higher expected income in one labor market as compared to the 
* 	 . .other and would not ')e an equiIibrium since income-maxini zing workers would 
migrate inorder to erode any such temporary differential. Substituting the 
above into (5), we hav =: = 0. We therefore find that when there Is 
a'shortage of educated workers the present value of investing ineducation and
 
the demand for education will remain unchanged if another person is educated.
 
Once the educational system has produced more than enough educated workers
 
to fill all the skilled jobs for which hiring is taking place, each educated
 
person must expect to be unemployed part of the time. If another person is
 
educated, the greater number of educated persons lowers the probability of
 
finding a skilled job, which in turn lowers the present value of becoming 
educated. Hence, < O, and our model implies that when there is a surplus 
of educated workers in the case of labor market stratification the demand for
 
education will decline if another person is educated.
 
These results are illustrated graphically in Figure I. Zones I and II
 
correspond respectively to shortages and surpluses of educated workers. In
 
quadrant (I),we see that the present value (PV) is constant while there is a
 
shortage 	of educated workers and declines monotonically thereafter. Taking
 
an illustrative D = f(PV) function in quadrant (i Ii), we derive the demand for 
education as a function of the supply of education, shown as D = g(S) In quadrant 
(iv). We 	 seetit labor markets are stratified, after a point the larger the 
size of 	the educated surplus in a country all other things equal the smaller 
the demand for education.
 
IConsider a simple migration model of the type used by Harris and
 
Todaro (1970) such that the agricultural wage (Wa) equals the expected urban
 
wage which Is the wage of an employed urban worker (Ju) multiplied by the
 
probability of being employed (Pu). If we regard Wa and Wu as fixed, any
 
outside 	shock will have only short run effects on the probability of finding
 
urban employment, since Pu will be unchanged in equilibrium. The result In the
 
text Is derived in an analogous manner from a much more complicated model of
 
the allocation of the labor force between labor markets.
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B. The Case of Bumping
 
In the bumping case, there are four distinct zones depending on the number
 
of educated workers relative to the numbor of jobs. For ease of reference, these
 
four zones are summarized inTable I.
 
Table I
 
Labor Market Zones in the Bumping Model
 
Zone I. Fewer educated workers Than skil led jobs 
Zone II. Surplus of educated workers, all enter skilled labor 
force 
Zone Ill. !umplng occurs, i.e., some educatedworkers enter the un­
skilled labor force and are hired proferentlally 
Zone IV. All modern sector job vacancies are fl lied by educated 
persons 
The first zone Is defined Ly a shortage of educated workers relative to
 
skilled jobs. Since the skIlled wage is higher than the unskilled wage, all 
educated workers "ouldenter the labor force for skilled jobs and be fully em­
ployed.
 
A second zone begins when there first occurs a surplus of educated persons
 
relative to skilled job hiring. Fcr some small surplus of educated workers,
 
there would be sufficiently little educated unemployment and a sufficiently
 
high probability of being employed tha- the present value of expected lifetime
 
Income of an educated worker in the skilled labor force (MES) would continue
 
to be greater than the present value of expected income of an educated worker
 
in the unskilled labor force (VEU). This being the case, income-maximizing
 
employees would choose partial employment/partial unemployment in the skilled
 
labor force In preference to full-time underemployment in the unskilled sector.
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Zones I and 1 in the bumpinj model are formally equivalent to the labor 
market stratilfcation case 'just described Thereforf?,e the pattern of the
 
demand for education as a funtion o,' supply (constant over Zone I and falling
 
over Zone II) also hoids in the bumping model.
 
After some point, there would be sufficient unemployment that VES would be
 
driven down and equal to VEu. This point marks the beginning of a third zone,
 
In which it would beprofitable for edlicnted workers to bump uneducated workers
 
out of unskilled jobs.
 
Once Zone III begilns. ardundercinploytnent becomes profitable, the demand
 
for education no longer declines monotonical ly with th-c number of educated per­
sons. Rather, we find that
 
When bunpirg istakingplace, educated and uneducated workers, each
 
choosing between rhe various labor mnarket alternatives open to them
 
in order to maxlrizq their expected incomes, will allocate themselves­
so that the private rate c.f return nd r'he dera-id for education will 
remain constant as r,.or- personc -ire educaied, 
This result is de-rnstrrred mi'rhenat ical Iv in Thesis-. Here, we limit ourselves 
to a few words of expiantor concerning its economiic origins. 
When bumping is taki:r, place. educated uorkers are choosing between the 
skilled and unskilled ibor mar.:ets so th:lt t-he Dr-,sent values o expected 
lifetime income is e h eni ,,) ae rqu~l If the markets are in such 
an equi Iibr~um aid anolhei- pe'son is educate;, the equilibrium will initially
 
be disturbed. If the ,jddit onal educated worker- enters the ski- led 
labor market,'
 
his presence causes the probabiW;i-y of findirg a skilled job to fall and there­
by lowers the presen value of expected income of an educated worker in the
 
skilled labor market beio,.. what he could earn in the unskilled labor market.
 
This would induce other educlted workers to leave the skilled market and enter 
the unskilled market, which -aises the proba'2ility of finding a skilled job. 
Equilibrium is restored when ihere has been sufficient shiftIng to raise the 
probabili',y of "inding a -k;lied job (P and the expected skilled income (VEs)
 
. ES 
i/
 
. .. . . . . . . . . .
 
back up to their oriciral level. Th., sam, ajustment processs and resultant
 
equilibrium folloi if -Ihe additicnal :wucat- orker- were to nave initially
 
entered the unskilld lahrr force.
 
Turning now to the rarkeis for unskilled worker.;, the presence of additional
 
educated persons in the unski I le6 labor r, rket reduces the number of jobs 
available to uneducated workers and thereby lowers their probai I ity of em­
ployment. The urban unski I led labor market is now less attractive than agricul­
ture and income-ma<irnizing uneJucated workers find it to tier advantage to 
return to or remain on the farm. As the';' do this the nro!9bility of an unedu­
cated workers finding an urban unski Iled job ifncroIses and V,JL rises relative
 
to VUA. After sufficient ou!-miqraf;on of unski Il.d wo rkrs fror: the urban sec­
tor, the unski I le lilor mar;ets will eui Iibrate with the probdbi lity of ob­
taining an urban urhs-,ilu joh and the rsent value of expected income of an 
uneducated person uf c-,ne rm i"i nq I e . 
We have th.,rofo-c she'n that whei bumrnin: is occurrinc and another person 
is educa t ed, t' reallWc-.ion of rho labor force )etwu'n the various labor mar­
kets will leaw, unCh.An-.ed the pr,:in v. ues of ¢XF;ctxd incomes for workers 
in each la-,or mf'k: t ' ,e+e. vho Ir O- i -nVesinqo in education and 
the demand for :.duic i(:n 'j;w als) r-ma in +;e sam,'. in tho zone where bumping 
is taking plac-.:-. 
Bumpira cnu!d contin oJti i ,.ir:<er rs all un­lJa. ara hired to fill 
skilled job vac-.nci:,., bft,:r that ;oinl, a fin .l zone Jwould begin with educated 
workers competin,1 airco'-.st themselves 'or both ski I led and unskilled jobs and 
2
 
uneducated workers. .- feciiv-ly excludedl from hroakirr; into the modern sector.
If society were to decide to edicate another person this would add to the 
number of seekors for si I ed jobs, which would lower the probability of an
 
educated worker findini a ski Iled job and lower the expected income if one is 
educated. The expected iicome of an uneducated w,,orkar, which is tIi- lifetime 
They must return t. tnoi'- oricinal levcl for a reason similar to the 
process described in tha last footrofe, 
2Due to s.rnioniiy orvsions ard o-rher 
reasons for job fixity, uneducated 
workers already ernpicyed n uns',ilej Jonls are (except for normal turnover) 
reta ined.
 
agricultural wage,would remain the same. Thereforr, the :)resent value of in­
vesting In education anid ",? derriand for educatl.:,n woul decline the larger 
the educated surpluI; in Zone IV.
 
The demand for ,ducatirn for a-terrative suDp! ies in the case of bumping 
Is summarized Tn Figure 2.
 
C. The Case of Pcolinq
 
In thc poolin-: modcel, there are foi.;r distinct zon"es. The first two are 
identical with thos-e of fhe bumpinn vodl. Aff.r fhere is sufficient unemploy­
ment to reduce V,. to VEI7, there eqin-; a.. thiro zone in whic-h sone surplus 
educated workers o, ter the ,rel -)f .,r-er f()r u.. ;Iie( iohs bul unli ke the 
bumping model Tire not hired preferentini ,'. f-)r ,oinT, tnere heci ins a 
fourth zone in ,,I oij-rdu.-te workers , ,0-in:; " profitalle -to enter the 
urban unskilled labor f:,c, and thal marret conft n;s Iy elucated workers. 
These zones are summarized in Tabie 2. 
lablIe 2 
Labor '.ar~et Zones in the lool in: "-ol 
Zone I. 	 Fawe e.ucated wor, rs t--n 5,:t 1 led jo[ 
Zone II .	 Sar ius .)f educated oirkers, al er I led abor 
force 
Zone II I .	 rdu,'-ted worLers ente-r th D usk il ad I .ALer force 
Zone IV. 	 Uneducatd ,.orker- have vacated t .he i I Iund labor force 
We shall sho., th-et thu-,.attern of th- dand f.,r education as a function 
of the supply -howi in Fliure 7 also holds ;n the 7nlinq model. In the pooling 
a Ilocu.ion tt:e en,ncermodel, the of n,.,r forc' e a person is educated in 
Zones I and II is th- s-:me as in the bu ,Pinj -d l 3ince the two are analyti­
cally equivalent.
 
Pv PV 450 
(i) .'TK 
SI 
I 
I 
-
I 
i 
) 
I 
( DyI 
(ht:Rc.r 
Fi'r 2 h 
I I II 
I ' 
I j 
l 
F uI .I 
, g I 
II 
II II 
u'asidct 
c' , 
II 
o 
i tI , 
I 
I * 
, II 
I I 
h 
BIc~t, r 
D-
b 
in 
I II I I! II I I 
i ofI I 
IrI~v 
Ir- I 
I I 
II II IVV 
in i th,I 
th Cases ' 
i 
n (~ Pii 
.ncieZns 
. 
-20-

Thus, the demand for education Is constant 
In Zone I and falls In Zoneill.
 
There is one important difference between the bumpin_ and pooling models,
 
however, and that is that Zone III in the pooling model begins 
later. This
 
is easily understood economically. In the bumping model, educated worker
an 

who chooses to enter the unskilled labor force earns the skilled wage and
 
Is fully-employed. In the pooling model, he Isonlypartially employed, so the
 
present value of his expected income is lower. Consequently, the opportunity
 
cost of being unemployed In the ski Iled labor force whlen there is poolIng is
 
less than when there is bumping. 'Workers would therefore be expected to
 
tolerate more unemrployment in the pooling case than In the bumpingcase.
 
Once Zone III is reacheJ and educated w.orkers begin 
-o enter the unskilled
 
labor force, the pooling model predicts a patterl which the reader mray find
 
surprising: Although educatei-l and uneducatcAd workers in the urban unskilled
 
labor market,are paid the same wage and have the 
same probabilities of employ­
ment, if another person is educated, educated workers would replace uneducated
 
urban -kct. Viewed in terms 

tunities, this makes rord economic sense. L1y being in ttl = cities, educated
 
ones in the unski labo aed of ,job search oppor­
workers, have a be 1- c,n- e oLobI ilninq hi;ih-payinq ski I led employment than 
7n. 

unskilled and agriculittral 1ebo mar!,ets assures that the present values of
 
expected income 3re eua'. This 

if they were on tiie f The mcve-ent of uneducated workers between the urban
 
,eans that ecucated workers can earn the same
 
wage in the city -ison the -ai'm and yet whi!e in the.city 'ave a better chance
 
at a ski iled job. Thus, we would ex>ec that educated workers ,)ould settle in
 
the cities. As +hey 
C , thisadds to the poo of seckers for unskilled jobs,
 
lowering the probabili1y of find"ng one, reducing the present value of expected
 
Income In the city beIw thep.resent viIue in agriculture, and driving uneducated
 
workers (who have the le-st tc lcse) back to "the farm until the present values
 
are again equal , Thus 
..

,he demand for educaton would be constant for alterna-

Sive educational supP l!e-; in Zone III.
 
Note that if educated workers did not have this improved job search oppor­
tunity, the only change when anoher nerson 
ii,educated would be that there
 
.. .. .. .. .
 
would be one morc, person ',n the urban unskilled labor market with education 
rather than %!ithou',. 
Finally, In Zone IV, VU uA and unedcated workers have vacated the 
urban sector. Except for starting with a larger educatedJ surplus, this zone 
is formally equivalent -lo Zone IV in the-bumping model and all previous results 
obtain. 
The Briqht Liqhi~s of the City Case 
I 
D. 

The bright IIghIs cf the clty'mode, is a varint of the bumping model. 
Rather than behaving in a pure expected income-maximizing manner, workers are 
assumed to maximize incorre subject to the behavicral ccnstraint that no one 
living in the city vould move back to the farm ever, if he could expect to earn 
more thore. 
This behavioral ,im:tation has no effect on the outcomes in Zones I and 
II, since there is rigr 4tion of both edicated gnd uneducated workers into the 
cities. Hoeever, oncL. bumping begins, the bumping model requires there to be
 
migration beck 'o the Tr-ral areas in order to preseirve equilibrium between 
the labor markets for uiieducated workers, .Since this i7 not allowed in the 
bright light"s efthe city; rmoel, the uneducated labor markelts would be in dis­
equilibrium. This; raise -('pn in-i'r guin n(yssibilly1 . 
When bumping is iakinq place in the bright ights of the city model, 
the labor force- aiiocaliloi, will b, suci that the Drivate rate of return 
and the dcm.9nd for educatici ,ould be exDer±cd to increase.if more persons 
are ec;ucaled. 
Why might this be expected?. If another person is educated, the educated 
workers will chocse oetween -,-he skilled and unski lled labor forces eo as to 
leave tne presrnt veue of expected incomes in the two markets equal to one 
This model was fii-s, suggested in my "Private and Social Returns to 
Education inLabOL'r Surr~ius. Economic-,," Instlitu-1- for Development Studies, 
University of Nairob:i, D~scussioi Paper No. 104, April, 1971,a rev/ised version 
of which is pub~ished Fa!Flelc;, 1!?720). Inrmither version, how.tever, was the 
m
prohibition agaln',,i out-migration ror urban arers made explicit. 
::: .:- ,.,':'-, .i" i:i'i ,; ::; - .i .! . ::, . -:. "; :." - " > ,: . -. :' <: ,.. . :-. 
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another and unchanged from th'eir original levels. This requires that at least
 
one educated worker enter the urban-unskilled labor force. There is now one
 
less urban unskilled Job available for the remaining uneducated workers. As a
 
result, the probability of an uneducated worker obtaining an urban unskilled
 
job falls, and this lowers the expected urban income for an uneducated worker.
 
Since by assumption of the bright lights of the city model uneducated workers
 
would not move from the city, the disequilibrium is not eroded as in the bumping
 
model and the present value of expected inccme of an uneducated worker falls.
 
The combined effect of a constant expected income for the educated worker and
 
a lower expected income for the uneducated is, of course, to raise the present
 
value and hence the demand for education.
 
Finally, there is such a larqe surplus of educated .:orkers Ihat uneducated 
workers have no chance of bei Iq hired for unsk Iled jobs. This marks the be­
ginning of Zone IV, in v.:hichx tere ,)IlII be uremplrIvent 'f tne educated in 
ski I and led another is educated,both the led the unski I Iabor markets. If person 
the more oducafted er-ns there are se. i,,inc a lgiv.en numb, r of jobs and so the 
lower the probability of any given eJucated worker beinci employed. This lowers 
the expected value of being oducat.3d, which in turn lowers the demand for edu­
cation. 
The demand for education schedule in the bright lights of the city case 
Is shown graphically in Figure 3. For ease of comparison, the demand for educa­
tion schedules derived for the four labor market models are shown together 
in Figure 4.
 
5. Concludinq Remark-;
 
We have described several alternative accounts of possible labor market 
behavior by workers and employers In less developed countries. Our analysis,
 
There will be only one if educated workers employed in unskilled jobs
 
have no chance of obtaining a skilled job, more than one otherwise.
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as summarized in Figures i 4, suggests tnree possible explanations for the
 
persistence of a high demand for education despite unemployment and under­
employment of substantial numbers of educated persons.
 
One possibility is that the scenario described by the bright lights
 
of the city model -- a range during which the demand rises as the supply
 
is Increased -- essentially describes the particular labor market circumstan­
ces and particular stages of development of at least some less developed,coun­
tries today. However, the validity of the bright lights of the city model has
 
not been established by rural-urban migration studies to 
date. I
 
A second possibility is that the demand for education may he relatively'in­
elastic with respect to private returns. This may be because education Is de­
manded primarily for i1he consumption or non-pecuniary ,....stment benefits it
 
confers and not for those financial returns which are measured by present values.
 
Alternatively, it may be because the resent vilue is already so large that
 
education isobviously a scund personal financial investment. The available evi­
latter position.2
 dence is fully consistent with the 

A third possible explEnation for the persi.,te nce of a high demand for 
education is that the present value of investinq in education may be relatively' 
inelastic with respect to the supply of education, To my knowledge, this 
hypothesis has not 9,, yet bee. subjectdJ to empirical test. 
It should be remarked that these three possibilities are in no way mutual ly 
exclusive. Rather, they -einforce e; ci other, and to the extent each is 
correct, they provide s(ound economic reasons for exrectinq the private demand 
for education to remain strong despite the existence of a large and growing 
surplus of educated worke-s in the labor market. This prediction challenges
 
the view that the sustained demand for education results from over-optimistic
 
labor market expectations compared to reality.
 
'This s the conclusion reached by Frank (1)71) after a thorough review
 
of the rural-urban migration literature.
 
2See Psacharopoulos and Hinchliffe op. cit. and fo6tnote I, p. 6....
 2 
This conclusicn 3ugge'-ts an impcrtaot policy in n ication for educafional 
planning. Suppose that 'r,lighii of a surplus-: of lhigh'.y-oducated workers the 
government of a less developed country wants 1-o real ocate its educational 
budget away f:'orr secondary and higher education and toward primary education. 
In the short rur tha government could s;imply adjust supply in the desired 
manner. Howeve-, in the absence of complementary measures to reduce the demand 
for secondary and higher education, the people would continue to push for more 
high-level educational facilities. Not only might the political preseures on 
officials tend to subvert the reallocation program but the people might also 
(as they did in Kenya) join together to corstruct their own private or community 
secondary schools which ,,ould result in an even larger surplus of educated 
workers. Thus, in order for a qover-iniental program to real locate educational 
resources to be effective, steps must be taken ho reduce the private present 
value of investinq in education. 
We have seen that the private re.turns to investinq in education depend on 
the earnings and employment probabi!ities of educated workers relatIve to the 
uneducated and ti)e private custs of acquiring an education. This points to 
the areas .. leverage might exerted. possible ofher3 be One means reducing 
the size of the orivate present value is "o introduce an incomes policy, either 
by narro'iing noinal skiIIe'-u illId wage differentials or by making the 
tax structure more proaressiv,. Another is to cause employers to question 
whether preferential niring by educational level is really necessary. Yet 
another is to charge students a larger share or perhaps even the full cost 
of their schooling; students who receive higher education could be charged
 
2
 
full costs, to be repaid over their working lives.
 
None of the proposed changes would be easy to implement, given the politi­
cal power of the groups whose interests would be adversely affected. But 
when one considers the deleterious effect on the economic and social develop­
ment of a country 01: continuing to spend scarce public funds to produce a 
weII-educated and unemIoved few While many others could be made literate, 
there iscause for rcmncern.
 
I'See DIaug i, Layard, and' WoodhalI( ,1969) 
2
A ternati ve io,n Fschemes are rsons l:erod in detai in FieIds I972b). 
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